A novel secrecy scenario of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) along with cooperative jammer(s) to improve secrecy performance is studied in this work. We first characterize secrecy performance in terms of positive secrecy rate probability, secrecy outage probability (SOP) and effective secrecy throughput (EST), and derive the closed-expressions of individual secrecy performance. The analytical results not only show an improvement on secrecy performance with the aid of cooperative jamming, but also clearly illustrate how each jammer affects the secrecy performance. We then continue the study of the individual secrecy performance for its asymptotic behaviors, and reveal it is only dependent on its relative distance to the eavesdropper over the desired receiver in a high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime. Finally, the maximization of overall secrecy performance is covered by investigating two optimization problems: 1) optimal selection of jammer(s) under the same transmit power; 2) optimal power allocation to each transmitter, including jammers, under the constraint of limited total transmit power. The solutions to these two problems are presented and demonstrated by an appropriate case.
I. INTRODUCTION A. BACKGROUND
High spectral efficiency and massive connectivity accommodation are two major advantages that make non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) one of the most promising technologies in the fifth-generation (5G) mobile communication system and beyond [1] - [4] . The power-domain NOMA allows multiple users simultaneously to share the same resource block, such as frequency, time or code, which are allocated orthogonally to avoid or alleviate user interference in the past four generations.
The benefits of high spectral efficiency and massive connectivity are achieved at the cost of co-channel interference.
The key technique for NOMA is successive interference cancellation (SIC), which performs multiuser decoding by mitigating interference from each user's decoding, and achieves the multiuser capacity [5] . In downlink (DL) NOMA, the transmitter sends signals with different weights to offer a sufficient power difference for each user. The user with a better channel can SIC the signals of users with bad channels.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Mamoun Alazab .
In uplink (UL) NOMA, the associated receiver can SIC decode users in any order and achieve the sum capacity of multiple users theoretically [5] . In order to enhance the capacity of the weakest user, it is typically carried out in descending order of each user's signal strength. That is, the strongest user is decoded first by treating the other users' signals as noise, whereas the weakest user will be decoded without interference since all the cochannel interference has been removed. Yet, in the secrecy scenario of UL NOMA, such an SIC order does not necessarily obtain the most secrecy throughput. As pointed out in [6] , on the contrary, the SIC order in ascending of signals' strength maximizes the overall secrecy throughput, in spite of further deteriorating the weakest users.
Recently, physical-layer security towards NOMA has been received a significant amount of attentions. However, there is very little literature concerned with UL NOMA. Most of them focused on DL NOMA. The initial study about secure DL NOMA was based on a single-input single-output (SISO) NOMA system, aiming to maximize the sum secrecy rate [7] , which was extended to multi-input multi-output (MIMO) by Tian et al. [8] for the similar optimization problem but subject to different constraints. Similar to other multiple-antenna cases, secure beamforming and power allocation are two important means to improve the secrecy performance of DL NOMA. References [9] and [10] focused on the optimization problem of secure beamforming and power allocation to maximize the sum achievable secrecy rate subject to the transmit power constraint and transmission rate requirements. A novel beamforming design was proposed in [11] to enhance physical layer security of a NOMA system with the aid of artificial noise (AN). The benefit from AN inspired researchers to contribute more work [12] - [16] , where AN-assisted NOMA can be divided into two categories according to emitting source, one emitting AN from the same transmitter along with desired signals [15] , [16] , the other emitting AN from the third-party, e.g., relays in cooperative NOMA [12] - [14] . The fundamental functions of relays in cooperative NOMA are forwarding signals. Both decode-and-forward (DF) and amplify-and-forward (AF) protocols in cooperative NOMA were naturally considered in [17] , [18] . Another concern with cooperative NOMA is the selection of relays, i.e., relay schemes [14] , [18] . Meanwhile, a large number of references combined NOMA with the cognitive radio (CR) network to further achieve spectral efficiency and security [19] - [22] . In [23] , the authors investigated the physical-layer security of a CR network aided with cooperative NOMA, and characterized the security-reliability tradeoff by deriving the connection outage probability and the secrecy outage probability and balancing between them.
Our previous work [24] is one of few references on secure UL NOMA. In that work, we investigated secrecy performance for multiple eavesdroppers with non-colluding and colluding scenarios. Yet, no jamming technique was utilized to improve security. The distribution of eavesdroppers was assumed to be random in [25] , where the coverage probability and effective secrecy throughput (EST) of a specific user were analyzed for a fixed or an adaptive transmission rate, and only a protect zone (an eavesdropper-exclusion area) was adopted to enhance the overall EST. Different from keyless physical security in above secure UL NOMA, [26] proposed an uplink chaos NOMA transmission scheme which is based on a common key encryption to realize a secure and large-capacity uplink transmission. In addition to the inherent intra-cluster interference in NOMA, the authors [27] studied the physical layer security of UL NOMA for cellular internet of things, where inter-cell interference was also taken into account. In [28] , a computation efficiency maximization problem was studied in NOMA-enabled mobile edge computing (MEC) networks. Physical-layer security was applied in that UL NOMA system to prevent multi-user computing tasks from eavesdropping.
A special type of UL multi-user wiretap channels, known as multiple access wiretap channels (MAC-WT), can be considered as a UL NOMA system, when the transmitters adopt superposition coding. In most of MAC-WT systems, authors characterized systems as a whole for overall secrecy performance from an information-theoretic perspective. Specifically, they typically focused on secrecy rate regions for proper encoding schemes and an upper bound for the secrecy sumrate. The notion of MAC-WT was first introduced by Ender Tekin et al. in [29] , where the authors identified achievable secrecy rate regions with Gaussian signaling for the degraded Gaussian MAC-WT. Later, an extension to a general Gaussian MAC-WT was studied such that the secrecy rate regions remained achieved based on the same signaling [30] . The weakness of Gaussian signaling based schemes without secure degrees of freedom (DoF) motivates the researchers for further work on the secure DoF of MAC-WT [31]- [33] . More work was investigated for fading MAC-WT [34] , [35] , aiming to characterize achievable ergodic secrecy rate regions and secure DoF.
In [36] , we shifted focus to individual secrecy performance for K -user fading MAC-WT in a more practical way. As the channels were assumed to be quasi-static fading, secrecy outage probability (SOP) and effective secrecy throughput were characterized. The closed-form expressions of secrecy performance were derived by employing two specific decoding methods, zero-forcing (ZF) and minimum mean-square error (MMSE), jointly with SIC. We later generalized the number of eavesdropper's antenna from single to multiple in [37] , where a novel SIC order scheduling scheme was presented based on each user's relative distance to the eavesdropper over the legitimate receiver, in addition to the closed-form expressions of individual secrecy performance. We further examined the homogeneous fading MAC-WT [6] , where secrecy scenarios can be found in satellite communications, and investigated the SIC order schemes from the perspective of the legitimate receiver. The studies in both [6] and [37] show the SIC order in ascending quality of each transmitter's channel achieves more overall secrecy performance at the cost of further deteriorating the secrecy performance of the transmitters with bad channel qualities.
B. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
As pointed out in [6] , [24] , [37] , the transmitters with bad channel qualities have bad secrecy performance in terms of EST even for a good SIC order, which enlightens us to switch these users into jammers to aid other users for improving their secrecy performance. We also care about which user(s) should be chosen as jammer(s) and how to allocate power to each user (including jammer(s)) so as to maximize the overall secrecy performance. The secure UL NOMA system in this work consists of one BS equipped with N antennas, one single-antenna eavesdropper and total K single-antenna users, where M of K users act as jammers. Similar to [37] , zero-forcing jointly with SIC is employed at the BS, and links from users to the BS and to the eavesdropper are independent and experiencing quasi-static Rayleigh fading. The secrecy performance is still characterized in terms of secrecy outage probability and effective secrecy throughput as key performance metrics. We further characterize the secrecy performance of positive secrecy rate probability for the purpose of sorting jammer candidates.
Different from [12] - [14] , where the jammers are fixed for emitting AN, the jammers in this work are dynamically selected, and switched into their original role of transmitters if the qualities of channels become better. Our secure NOMA network modeled is also distinct from [23] , where the users with stronger channel condition act as relays to help users with weaker channel condition. On contrary, in this work, users with weaker channel condition are selected to act as jammers to assist users with stronger channel condition so as to achieve more overall secrecy performance. Moreover, those literature addressed the secure problems from DL NOMA. In contrast with [27] , where users were paired and NOMA was carried out between the pair, our UL NOMA system has more generality that all users carry out NOMA, gaining higher spectral efficiency and more connectivity accommodation. Furthermore, full-duplex BS jamming is adopted to enhance security in [27] , whereas we employ the weakest users' jamming, on one hand to improve the strongest users' secrecy performance (in turn improve the overall secrecy performance), on the other hand to avoid these users revealing secrecy message (being eavesdropped).
It is worth mentioning that effective SIC is still workable even if the weakest user is firstly decoded, as long as its transmission rate is low enough. As such, it has very low secrecy performance. Since these weakest users tend to be easily eavesdropped that they are switched into the role of jammers. We adopt EST rather than SOP as the ultimate secrecy metric, as it allows explicitly for controlling secrecy rate, just as in [25] . Moreover, the maximum EST (max-EST) over the secrecy rate exists whereas the minimum SOP over the predefined secrecy rate always makes the secrecy rate be zero. Actually, the optimal secrecy rate to maximize EST is a balance point between SOP and the secrecy rate. By the way, to an individual user, both EST and SOP are limited to certain values even if the transmit power approaches to infinity, which prompts us to consider optimal power allocation to maximize overall secrecy performance subject to limited total power.
In order to learn about jamming-aided secrecy performance, we first derive individual EST via deriving individual SOP as well as their asymptotic behaviors under cooperative jamming. Then, we study how to select jammer(s) and how to allocate power to each user (including jammer(s)) to maximize overall max-ESTs given the total power constraint.
To the best of our knowledge, dynamic cooperative jamming with UL NOMA is first presented in this work. We believe the problems formed and solved in this work are of great significance. The main challenges of this work:
• The derivation of closed-form expressions of individual secrecy performance with cooperative jamming. Jamming makes signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the eavesdropper more complex, and leads to complicated expressions for individual secrecy performance.
• The solution to optimal power allocation, which are not only allocated to transmitters but also to jammers.
We summarize the major contributions of this work as follows:
• Introduce dynamic cooperative jamming in a secure UL NOMA system, and characterize instantaneous individual achievable secrecy rate.
• Derive the closed-form expressions of individual secrecy performance in terms of positive secrecy rate probability, secrecy outage probability and effective secrecy throughput, and offer valuable insights into the impact of jamming on secrecy performance.
• Examine the asymptotic behaviors of individual secrecy performance for extreme values of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and reveal the relationship between the secrecy performance and its location in a high SNR regime.
• Find out a tradeoff between the roles of transmitters and jammers to maximize overall secrecy performance.
• Figure out the problem of optimal power allocation to each user, including jammers, under the constraint of overall transmit power.
C. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents and characterizes the secrecy model of the UL NOMA system with cooperative jammers. Section III provides the closed-form expressions of individual secrecy performance in three metrics, the asymptotic behaviors of which are examined in Section IV. In Section V, two optimization problems are addressed to maximize the overall secrecy performance. Simulations and numerical results are demonstrated in Section VI. Section VII concludes the work at the end. Notation: Symbolize vectors and matrices by a bold font. Denote I m as the m × m identity matrix; || · || is the Euclidean norm operator. Sets are denoted by a script font. A\B denotes set A minus set B, ∅ is an empty set, and | · | indicates the cardinality of a set. CN , Exp and χ 2 m specify the circular symmetric complex Gaussian distribution, the exponential distribution and the chi-squared distribution with m degrees of freedom, respectively. Let γ (·, ·) and (·, ·) be the incomplete gamma function and complementary incomplete gamma function, respectively. Ei(·) is the exponential integral function; [·] + = max(·, 0). log is the base 2 logarithm. Pr(·) denotes probability.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a cellular secure UL NOMA system, which consists of a base station (BS), an eavesdropper (Eve), and K users (U 1 , . . . , U K ), as shown in Fig. 1 . The BS is equipped with N antennas, N ≥ K , and the other nodes are single antenna. During uplink transmissions, M of K users act as jammers (denoted as a set J ) for the purpose of disrupting Eve by transmitting artificial noise, e.g., pseudo-random signals, which the BS knows exactly. As in [37] , all the K users perform NOMA by sharing the same radio resource. The channels are assumed to be independent and quasi-static Rayleigh fading. Suppose the BS has the exact knowledge of each user's channel state information (CSI), but only knows the statistical characteristics of eavesdropper's channels, which are assumed to be estimated perfectly by Eve for the worst case.
For all k ∈ K {1, . . . , K }, we give notation descriptions as follows:
• x k and P k denote the signal and its average transmit power from U k .
• h k ∼ CN(0, δ 2 k I N ) and g k ∼ CN(0, σ 2 k ) denote the N ×1 main channel gain vector and the eavesdropper's channel gain from U k to the BS and to Eve, respectively.
and w e ∼ CN(0, N e ) are the complex Gaussian noise at the BS and Eve, respectively.
are defined as the reciprocals of the average received SNRs (from U k ) at the BS (on each diversity branch) and Eve, respectively. Thereby, the instantaneous composite signals received at the BS and Eve can be described by
where the jamming signals have been canceled out from the instantaneous composite signals at the BS, since the BS knows what are received from the jammers.
A. INDIVIDUAL ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE
To a specific user, its instantaneous achievable secrecy rate is the difference between its instantaneous capacities of main and eavesdropper's channels [38] . In this UL NOMA scenario, the BS introduces SIC for multi-user decoding, with which the decoded signals will be eliminated from the composite signal to reduce cochannel interference for the next user at each step. To U k , the composite signal left at the BS can be formulated as,
where ⊆ K\J \{k} is the cochannel interferer set (index). When = K\J \{k}, (3) is equivalent to (1), specifying U k is decoded at first. = ∅ means no interference term in (3), implying U k is decoded at last.
Similar to [37] , zero forcing (ZF) is employed. The main principle of ZF decoding: project the received signal onto the null space of the interference space to eliminate the interference signal. To be specific, we project y ( ) k onto the subspace V ( ) k , which is orthogonal to the subspace spanned by the vectors {h i |∀i ∈ }. We describe V k . Due to the independence of h 1 , h 2 , ..., h K , the rank of the spanned subspace is supposed to be full (i.e.,
At the side of Eve, a conservative assumption is adopted that all user interference (except jamming signal) can be eliminated. As such, we reduce and re-express (2) as
The instantaneous eavesdropper's capacity for U k is
where ξ i = |g i | 2 P i N e ,∀i ∈ K. Obviously, the instantaneous achievable secrecy rate for U k can be expressed as
B. STATISTICS OF γ ( )
We have derived in [37] that γ
Here, we replace the cardinality | | with n, and rewrite γ 
For simplicity, we omit the superscript (n) of the argument γ (n) k in the above expression, and we will treat the same way for other arguments later in this work if necessary.
Due to the assumption of independence among the channels as well as experiencing Rayleigh fading, all ξ i (∀i ∈ K) in η (J ) k are mutually independent and exponentially distributed, i.e., ξ i ∼ Exp(µ i ) (∀i ∈ K). We also have derived the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a random variable similar to η (J ) k in [37] , substituting and yielding
Since µ i = µ k , ∀i = k, i, k ∈ J , with almost probability 1, we further make a transformation of (9) for easy derivation in the next section.
where
In the case of J = ∅, the CDF is reduced to
III. INDIVIDUAL SECRECY PERFORMANCE
In this section, the secrecy performance of an individual user is investigated in terms of three secrecy metrics. We first characterize the positive secrecy rate probability, which can be utilized to determine the jammer candidate order. Then, the intermediate metric, i.e., secrecy outage probability, is derived in order to acquire the ultimate secrecy metric of the effective secrecy throughput.
A. POSITIVE SECRECY RATE PROBABILITY
According to (4), (6) and (7), the positive secrecy rate probability of U k with the aid of jammers in set J can be formulated as
We present the closed-form expression in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The positive secrecy rate probability of U k with jammer set J and n co-channel interferers can be expressed as
where a i is defined in (11) , and U(n, β, µ)
Proof: See Appendix A. Observing the closed-form expression in (14) , one can find the individual secrecy performance in this metric has nothing to do with the transmit power of U k , since the result of λ k µ k eliminates P k . Moreover, in the path-loss model, λ k ∝ d α b,k and µ k ∝ d α e,k , where d b,k and d e,k are the distances from U k to the BS and to Eve, respectively, and α denotes a path-loss exponent. Equation (14) can be expressed from the perspective of a distance ratio by substituting λ k µ k = (
Another interesting thing is that we can select optimal jammers from candidates in ascending order of their relative distances to Eve over BS. In order to achieve more overall secrecy performance, it is rational for the BS to select M of K users with the lowest positive secrecy rate probabilities as jammers.
The positive secrecy rate probability without jamming is given,
where no superscript of (J ) implies no jamming, and the expression regarding relative distance (distance ratio) is applied. It is worth mentioning (16) can not directly be derived from the result in (14) . This is derived from the process in Appendix A by replacing the CDF with that in (12) .
Apparently, by fixing n and N , P ps,k (n) is only dependent on U k 's relative distance to Eve over BS, and this is an increasing function of the relative distance. Therefore, for the same transmit power, selecting M users with the lowest relative distances for jamming maximizes the overall secrecy performance, compared with any other selections for the same number of jammers. In another way, one can first sort the jammer candidates in ascending order of their relative distances, and then the first M candidates are the optimal selection.
B. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The secrecy outage probability is defined as the probability of an achievable secrecy rate that is less than a predefined secrecy rate. To a specific user U k with jammer set J and n cochannel interferers, this is formulated as
where R s is the predefined secrecy rate.
Similarly, we present the closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability in form of a theorem.
Theorem 2: The secrecy outage probability of an individual user U k with cooperative jamming from the users in set J but at the presence of n-user interference can be expressed as
γ (a, x) and (a, x) are the incomplete gamma function and the complementary incomplete gamma function, respectively, and γ (a, x) + (a, x) = (a).
Proof: See Appendix B. The term i∈J a i (µ i ) in (18) completely characterizes the impacts from jammer set J (J = ∅), which we call the jamming impact factor. We also note i∈J a i = 1 is always satisfied, which can be proved through the mathematical induction. We omit the process of proof here, due to the limit space. For any single jammer (e.g., J = {j}), the jamming impact factor is reduced to (µ j ), as a j = 1 for J = {j}, ∀j ∈ K. As such, the jamming impact factor from set J is an affine combination of those from each single jammer in the set.
Intuitively, with an increase of jammers, the secrecy outage probability decreases. That is, mathematically, for any j ∈ J , (µ j ) > i∈J a i (µ i ). Actually, the above inequality is satisfied.
Let us divert to study the property of a i . Without loss of generality, suppose J = {1, 2, . . . , |J |} and µ 1 < µ 2 < . . . < µ |J | , then a 1 , a 3 , . . . are positive and the rest of a 2 , a 4 , . . . are negative, i.e., only |J |/2 of them are positive.
To explain simply, we take two jammers for instance, e.g., J = {i, j} and µ i < µ j . It leads to a i > 0 and a j < 0. Hence, the jamming impact factor from J is (µ j ) − a i ( (µ j ) − (µ i )) or (µ i ) + a j ( (µ j ) − (µ i )) by setting a j = 1 − a i or a i = 1 − a j . As (·) is an increasing function, (µ j ) − a i ( (µ j )− (µ i )) < (µ j ) and (µ i )+a j ( (µ j )− (µ i )) < (µ i ) are both satisfied. This is the end of our explanation.
Complementary to the secrecy outage probability, the secrecy transmission probability can be formulated as
and P (J ) ps,k (n) = P (J ) st,k (n, 0) is always satisfied. Obviously, it is a decreasing function of n and/or R s .
C. EFFECTIVE SECRECY THROUGHPUT
Recall from [40] that EST is introduced to evaluate secrecy throughput by multiplying the secrecy transmission probability at a certain secrecy rate with that secrecy rate. Mathematically, this is defined as
Here, the closed-form expression has been obtained immediately based on the previous result in (18) .
A little different from the secrecy throughput in [41] which is defined as the product of a target secrecy rate and the probability that an achievable rate at the legitimate receiver is greater than the target secrecy rate, the EST is the multiplication of a target secrecy rate and the probability that an achievable secrecy rate is greater than the target secrecy rate.
Similar to previous ESTs in [24] and [37] , T (J ) k (n, R s ) has monotonicity regarding n and all µ i , i ∈ K . Specifically, it decreases with n increasing but increases with µ i . Furthermore, the monotonicity over the spatial diversity gain also exists such that the EST increases with the increment of N . Yet, the monotonicity for R s is not applicable. Since P (J ) so,k (n, R s ) is an exponentially increasing function of R s , the multiplication of its complement with R s makes the result increase first and then decline fast, which implies there exists a peak for this EST curve.
We call the secrecy rate to achieve the EST peak (max-EST) as the optimal secrecy rate, which obviously varies from different n. The smaller n the higher optimal secrecy rate. In addition, the optimal secrecy rate is not greater than the main capacity C 
where R o(n) s specifies the optimal secrecy rate for a certain n. Although T (J ) max,k (n, ·) is not the function of R s , as this argument has been eliminated during maximizing, its arguments include but not limit to transmit power, reciprocals of the average received SNRs and the number of antennas. We will transform T (J ) max,k (n, ·) into other forms if necessary later in this work.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
Let us continue the individual secrecy performance by investigating its asymptotic behaviors with N and transmit power (i.e., SNR) approaching to an extreme value.
A. ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR WITH N
Although the secrecy performance increases with the increment of N , we can not obtain the asymptotic results from VOLUME 8, 2020 (14) and (18) directly when N approaches to infinity. We proceed with the processes of the proof in Appendix A and B.
Examine the PDF f γ (n) k (γ k ) in (8) , one can find f γ (n) k (γ k ) → 0 is satisfied when N → ∞. We then have
The results show the asymptotic secrecy outage probability, which is always 0, has nothing to do with the secrecy rate and any other arguments, whereas the asymptotic EST is just equal to its secrecy rate, which is definitely constrained to the main capacity.
B. ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR WITH SNR
Recall the definitions of λ k and µ k in Section II such that λ k → 0 and µ k → 0 when P k → ∞, whereas the ratio of them is not affected. We define λ k /µ k = β k , which is usually not equal to zero.
We note there is no relation between the positive secrecy rate probability of U k and its transmit power P k . Thus, its asymptotic expression with SNR is just the same as (14) .
Different from the result in (18) , the asymptotic secrecy outage probability with SNR is given,
Proof: As λ k → 0, γ (N − n, λ k (2 R s − 1)) → 0 and e λ k (1−2 Rs ) → 1 are satisfied. Comparing (23) with (18), the problem is changed into proving
After removing the same terms in both sides, it can further be transformed into proving the following expression.
Obviously, the above expression is satisfied when µ k → 0.
The proof is done. The asymptotic EST with SNR can be achieved accordingly,
In the path-loss model, the asymptotic expressions can be formulated in terms of the relative distance to BS over Eve by replacing β k with (d b,k /d e,k ) α , i.e.,
They show individual secrecy performance in a high SNR regime depends on certain user's relative distance rather than its transmit power. In other words, the secrecy performance is location-dependent, and the BS can calculate each user's secrecy performance according to their positions and estimate the optimal secrecy rate for each user as well.
Remark 1: It is more likely to know the location of Eve than its CSI. To this end, the asymptotic results are meaningful.
V. PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION
In the last two sections, we have investigated the secrecy performance of an individual. This section studies the secrecy performance from the viewpoint of the BS, which usually does not care for any single user but care about overall secrecy performance from all users in its cell. As mentioned, two factors, jammers and transmit power, impact the overall secrecy performance significantly. We study two optimal problems of jammer selection and power allocation respectively for the same purpose of maximizing overall max-ESTs.
Without loss of generality, we sort user indexes (U 1 , U 2 , ... , U K ) according to their relative distances to Eve over the BS from the lowest to the highest, i.e.,
A. OPTIMAL SELECTION OF JAMMERS
To an individual user, the more jammers the higher secrecy performance. Yet, more jammers mean less available users for transmitting secrecy message, in turn probably achieving less overall secrecy performance. Therefore, we need to find a tradeoff.
Actually, we have known the optimal jammer selection order since jammer candidates have been sorted in advance. As mentioned in Subsection III-A, if jammer candidates are sorted in ascending order of each user's relative distance, choosing the first M candidates could maximize overall secrecy performance for this number of jammers. Specifically, for one jammer, U 1 is chosen; for two, the jammer set is {U 1 , U 2 }, and so on. The problem is then converted into determining the number of jammers (M ).
Thereby, the optimal problem can be described as: under the same transmit power for each user (P), find the optimal number of jammers (M * ) to maximize overall max-ESTs.
Similarly, the best SIC order is also sorted in ascending order of relative distances [37] . That is, the user with a lower relative distance is SIC decoded before the one with a higher relative distance. This is applied among the rest of available transmitters. As a result, the interferer number (n) for U k is K −k, for all M + 1 ≤ k ≤ K .
Finally, the optimal problem can be formulated as
where the max-EST function T
max,k (n, ·) is re-expressed by adding jammer number and transmit power as arguments.
The optimal solution is denoted as
Although, the closed-form expression is not available, the optimal jammer number M * can be obtained by numerical-finding. We will demonstrate it with an appropriate case in Subsection VI-C.
B. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
Let us continue to study the problem of optimal power allocation to each user to maximize the overall max-ESTs, with constraint of total transmit power (denoted as P total ). Here, the jammer set (equivalent to the number of jammers) is determinate, whereas the power allocation to each jammer is required.
Similarly, first |J | users (U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U |J | ) play the role of jammers. The best SIC order is also applied among U |J |+1 , . . . , U K . Consequently, the optimal problem can be formulated as follows,
Here, we rewrite the form of the max-EST function T (J ) max,k (n, ·) by including the jamming power from each jammer (P 1 , . . . , P |J | ) as well as the transmit power from a specific transmitter (P k ) as the arguments.
Applying the method of Lagrange multipliers, we obtain the Lagrange function as follows, L(P 1 , . . . , P K , L)
max,k (K −k, P 1 , . . . , P |J | , P k )
where L is a Lagrange multiplier.
One can note it is hard to make partial derivatives of the Lagrange function in (33) over P j for 1 ≤ j ≤ |J |, thus the optimal problem can not be figured out directly. However, if P 1 , . . . , P |J | are fixed, the partial derivative of L(P 1 , . . . , P K , L) with respect to P k for all |J | + 1 ≤ k ≤ K can be done numerically, and the optimal solution for P |J |+1 , . . . , P K under fixed P 1 , . . . , P |J | can be solved. Moreover, the number of jammers is usually less, e.g., 1 to 2. As such, we can use the exhaustive search method for all possible P 1 , . . . , P |J | to figure out the final optimal solution.
Make partial derivatives of L(P 1 , . . . , P K , L) over P k for all |J | + 1 ≤ k ≤ K with fixed P 1 , . . . , P |J | , and let the results be 0, yielding
Note the optimal solution (P o |J |+1 , . . . , P o K ) for certain P 1 , . . . , P |J | makes all of the derivatives identical to each other. Since power should not be negative, the optimal power is referred to as [P o k ] + , which is subject to . . , P |J | } for the most overall max-ESTs, obtaining the optimal solution {P * 1 , P * 2 , . . . , P * K } We will demonstrate it in detail in Subsection VI-D.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Numerical results are presented in this section to further reveal and verify previous research results. Since all these three secrecy performance metrics, positive secrecy rate probability, secrecy outage probability and effective secrecy throughput, are consistent, we illustrate only in terms of EST hereinafter to save the space of this work. The number of antennas at the BS is assumed to be 5, i.e., N = 5, and the pure ''SNR'' refers specifically to average SNR received at the BS from a certain transmitter, if not specified otherwise throughout this section.
A. IMPACTS OF SNR AND SIC ORDERS
Let us examine the impacts of SIC orders and SNR on the individual secrecy performance first. Fig. 2 displays the curves of EST versus R s for different values of n and SNR. In Fig. 2(a) , the curves are with respect to four different SNRs (−3 dB, 3 dB, 10 dB and ∞) and n = 0, 1, respectively, whereas Fig. 2(b) for the same SNRs but n = 2, 3. It is worth mentioning the analytical curves are generated based on (21) , where the ratio of average SNR at the BS to that at Eve (for a specific transmitter) is β = 0.8, and one jammer brings jamming by an average SNR of 0 dB at Eve.
As expected, the EST increases with SNR increasing. Especially, in a low SNR regime, the EST goes up significantly. For the case of n = 1, the max-EST climbs from 0.586 bits/s/Hz for −3 dB to 1.0533 bits/s/Hz for 3 dB by increasing 0.4673 bits/s/Hz, whereas there is only an increment of 0.3207 bits/s/Hz from 3 dB to 10 dB, which is from 1.0533 bits/s/Hz to 1.3740 bits/s/Hz. Moreover, the max-EST for this case is always limited to 1.4950 bits/s/Hz. This is the maximum of asymptotic EST, which is the function of β.
A good SIC order for an individual transmitter means a low number of interferers n, in turn, a high EST. For SNR of 3 dB, the max-EST for n = 3, n = 2, n = 1, n = 0, are 0.5474, 0.8168, 1.0533, 1.2608 bits/s/Hz, respectively. Besides, a low n can overcome the disadvantage of SNR. To be concrete, the max-EST for SNR of 3 dB and n = 1 (1.0533 bits/s/Hz) is greater than that for SNR of ∞ and n = 3 (0.9419 bits/s/Hz).
As mentioned, each EST curve has a peak, to which the optimal secrecy rate R o s (n) is n-dependent. We confirm the lower n the higher R o s (n). Numerically, in 3 dB, the optimal secrecy rates for each n from 0 to 3 are 1.9, 1.7, 1.5 and 1.2 bits/s/Hz, respectively. By the way, the resolution of the secrecy rate is 0.1 bits/s/Hz for numerical-finding. Fig. 3 are EST curves for jamming and no-jamming cases, where n = 1, β is still equal to 0.8, SNR is assumed to be 3 dB, and two jamming SNRs at Eve are 0 dB and 3 dB, respectively.
B. COMPARISONS OF NO-JAMMING AND JAMMING ESTS

Illustrated in
The no-jamming EST curve (red solid line) is generated based on the closed-form expression from [37, Eq. (16) ]. Its max-EST is 0.7840 bits/s/Hz, which rises up to 1.0533 bits/s/Hz after adding one jammer with 0 dB (see blue dashed line). By adding one more jammer with 3 dB, the max-EST further promotes to 1.3335 bits/s/Hz (see black dash-dot line). All these observations verify cooperative jamming increases the secrecy performance for one specific transmitter.
We further compare the EST for two jammers with that for one jammer producing an equivalent jamming SNR. The green dotted curve is the EST for jammer bringing 4.8 dB interference at Eve, which is the sum of two jammers' SNRs (0 dB and 3 dB). One can note these two curves are very close to each other. By observing the SINR in (6) , each jamming (interference) term obeys an exponential distribution, and the sum of two exponentially distributed variables do not keep the same distribution. Therefore, these two forms of jamming do not overlap each other.
C. OPTIMAL SELECTION OF JAMMER(S)
We demonstrate how to select optimal jammer(s) to make the overall max-ESTs the most by a cellular secure UL NOMA scenario illustrated in Fig. 4 , where there are 4 busy (legitimate) users and 1 idle (potential eavesdropper) user. It is rational to assume the BS has the information of all users' locations, including the eavesdropper (Eve), in its cell. Then, the BS can figure out each user's distance to itself and to Eve, respectively, which are shown in Table 1 . One can note the legitimate users have been indexed via each relative distance to Eve over BS from the nearest to the farthest. This also implies the order of jammer candidates and the SIC order in the rest of users are determined. For instance, for 2 jammers, the candidates are U 1 and U 2 , and the SIC order for the rest of users are U 3 → U 4 .
The background noise power at both the BS (one diversity branch) and Eve is assumed to be −90 dBm, i.e., N b = N e = −90 dBm. Suppose the length of each grid in Fig. 4 is equal to 20 meters, the path loss in dB: L = 10α lg(d) + 43.5 is provided, where α = 2.1 and d is the distance in meter, and each user's transmit power is identical to 2 mW.
Based on the above assumptions, we numerically find out each available transmitter's max-EST under the number of jammer(s) from 0 to 3. The results are listed in Table 2 , along with overall max-ESTs.
From Table 2 , one can find the maximization of the overall max-ESTs is achieved when jammer number is 1 (M = 1), i.e., only U 1 acting as a jammer and the rest of users transmitting secrecy message is the optimal strategy from the perspective of overall max-ESTs.
D. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
Reuse the scenario in Fig. 4 to demonstrate how to allocate optimal power to each user (including jammer) subject to limited total transmit power. Here, we make the same assumption about noise power, grid length and path loss as in Subsection VI-C, and adopt the optimal selection for one jammer. As a result, U 1 is chosen as jammer, and the other users are the available transmitters for the BS. Calculate each transmitter's derivative of the max-EST over its transmit power via numerical-finding, and map them into the same coordinate axis (see Fig. 5 ), where the jamming power (P 1 ) ranges from 0.1 to 1 mW with the resolution of 0.1 mW.
As pointed out in Section V, for a specific P 1 , the condition for an optimal power allocation of {P 2 , P 3 , P 4 } is that each user's derivative is equal to each other at its allocated Here, T
max,k (n,P 1 ,P k ) ∂P k (k = 2, 3, 4). Obviously, we can exhaustively search all {P o 2 , P o 3 , P o 4 } for each P 1 from 0.1 mW to 1 mW, and obtain the final optimal power allocation solution {P * 1 , P * 2 , P * 3 , P * 4 } that maximizes overall max-ESTs.
The exhaustive search results for total transmit power of 2 mW are listed in Table 3 . From the table, one can acquire that the power allocation of {P 1 = 0.2 mW, P o 2 = 0.38 mW, P o 3 = 0.64 mW, P o 4 = 0.78 mW} achieves the most overall max-ESTs. In other words, the optimal solution to 2 mW is {P * 1 = 0.2 mW, P * 2 = 0.38 mW, P * 3 = 0.64 mW, P * 4 = 0.78 mW}. Note the power resolution for P 2 , P 3 and P 4 is 0.02 mW, here. Fig. 6 shows the derivatives of max-EST over transmit power for the jamming power of 0.2 mW. Moving baseline to the position of the blue solid line makes the sum of each corresponding power meet the amount of total transmit power of 2 mW. This is called graphic solution for this optimal allocation problem. Table 4 is the exhaustive search results for the case of total transmit power of 3 mW. The optimal power allocation is {P * 1 = 0.4 mW, P * 2 = 0.58 mW, P * 3 = 0.94 mW, P * 4 = 1.08 mW}, and the corresponding graphical solution is demonstrated in Fig. 7 .
VII. CONCLUSION
We have considered the secrecy scenario of cooperative jamming for improving secrecy performance in the UL NOMA system at the presence of one eavesdropper. The closedform expressions of individual secrecy performance are first derived in terms of positive secrecy rate probability, secrecy outage probability and effective secrecy throughput. With the analytical and numerical results, we have provided valuable insights into the impacts of SIC orders, SNR as well as jamming on the individual secrecy performance. The study of individual secrecy performance is continued by asymptotic analysis. It shows the performance depends on the SNR ratio of BS to Eve in a high SNR regime, i.e., relative distance to Eve over BS for the path-loss model. We then investigate overall secrecy performance from the perspective of BS by introducing two optimal problems: 1) optimal selection of jammers for the same transmit power, 2) optimal power allocation to each user, including jammer(s), subject to limited total transmit power. Both optimal problems are aimed to maximize the overall max-ESTs. For the first problem, as the jammer candidates are indexed in ascending order of relative distances, the problem is converted into determining the number of jammer(s). For the latter, the problem can be solved graphically by fixing jamming power, and then via exhaustive search for each jammer power. Finally, we demonstrated the solutions to these two problems with a proper case.
APPENDIXES APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Given (8) and (10), jointly with the independence of γ 
where the superscripts of η (J ) k and γ (n) k have been dropped during derivation, and f η (J ) k (η k ) is the PDF of η (J ) k . In step (a), we transform the expression with γ k = µ i µ k x. The proof is completed.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The process of the derivation for the secrecy outage probability of U k is shown as follows, P (J ) so,k (n, R s ) = Pr 
where γ k = x − 2 R s ( µ i µ k − 1) − 1 is substituted in step (a).
The following integral result is applied [42, Eq.(3.381.9)] during the above derivation, ∞ u x m e −βx dx = (m + 1, βu) β m+1 .
The proof is completed.
